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Studies concerning interlocking directorships have been carried
out among Polish joint stock corporations. The main source of
data have been the announcements that are to be published by
corporations regularly in a journal called Business and Court Gazette
(bcg). Interlocking directorships constitute a network among cor-
porations the use of which enables co-ordinated management of
the whole group. The phenomenon of interlocking directorships
in Polish joint stock companies can be compared to the same phe-
nomenon existing in other countries. About 13.43 percent of Pol-
ish joint stock company directors possess additional directorships.
The average number of directorships for the whole group em-
ployed by Polish joint stock companies is 1,207, and 2,541 for peo-
ple who hold more than one mandate. There is a positive correla-
tion between the total investments in the Polish economy and the
number of multiple directorships.
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The Notion of Interlocking Directorships
Generally there are two models of board organisation. The usa,
Britain and Ireland companies operate a unitary board system,
whereby all legal responsibilities are vested in one board headed
by a chairman. In Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Switzerland
and Poland, a form of two-board management exists, with executive
and supervisory board. The distinction between the two is very close
to the distinction between the executive and non-executive directors
in the Anglo-American model, and therefore the two models can be
considered together (Mac Canna, Brennan, and O’Higgins 1998).
Many executive (inside) directors and non-executive (outside) di-
rectors hold only one directorship, however, others, particularly out-
side directors, hold more than one directorship. The situation in
which one inside or outside director at the same time serves in two
corporations is called an ‘interlocking directorship’ and this direc-
tor is called an ‘interlocking director’. Interlocking directorships are
more common in groups of outside directors, as they include a num-
ber of public and political figures who are recruited from other com-
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panies and especially from the banking, insurance, and investment
sectors (Scott 1991).
The phenomenon of interlocking directorships can be interpreted
in different ways depending on the goal of the interpretation, on the
person who performs the interpretation, and when the interpreta-
tion is made.
The first interpretation of the concept of interlocking directorships
comes from political science. From this point of view interlocking
directorships are interpreted as ‘the traces of power’, ‘class hege-
mony’, and ‘as vehicles in the accumulation of capital along an inte-
grated financial-industrial axis’ (Carroll and Alexander 1999). As a
result of this researchers have been worried about ‘the concentration
of power in only few hands’ (Mac Canna, Brennan, and O’Higgins
1998).
Brayshay, Cleary and Sellwood (2006) described the links between
firms and individual economic actors as ‘power geometry’, driving
forward and shaping the internationalisation of business activity.
Directors are recruited from the upper-classes and form a corpo-
rate elite (inner circle) of multiple directors of similar social back-
ground (Mac Canna, Brennan, and O’Higgins 1998). Their director-
ships spread throughout the economy, and they form the business
elite of corporate decision makers with power and influence across
the business system as a whole (Scott 1991; Brickley, Linck, and
Coles 1999).
The second interpretation of the concept of interlocking director-
ships comes from the social science. Here they are interpreted as
social relations and during the study some sociological tools have
been used, for example, the Social Network Analysis (sna) technique
(Mac Canna, Brennan, and O’Higgins 1998).
The third interpretation comes from management science. Here
they are interpreted as an instrument of corporate control or as de-
vices to monitor firms. For example, Barbi (2000) understands the
interlocking directorship phenomenon ‘as a legal instrument in or-
der to make the control position in a firm steadier’. The multiple po-
sitions of executives create links between corporations. These links
can contribute to considerable stability in the corporate governance.
The interpretation proposed by Theisen (2000) also comes from
management science. He distinguishes two kinds of interlocking di-
rectorships. In his opinion interlocking directorships can, firstly, re-
sult from the accidental overlapping of business activities conducted
by two people and, secondly, they can also reflect the conscious and
intentional manner of establishing the links between enterprises at
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the level of people involved, or be geared towards intensifying or
stabilising existing links. These links can be either at the level of
the owners (in this case we can speak of ‘interlocking ownerships’)
or they can be at the level of the directors in which case we speak
of ‘interlocking directorships’. Theisen wrote: ‘Interlocking owner-
ships are typical for medium sized enterprises and family enter-
prises. Interlocking directorships occur irrespective of company size’
(Theisen 2000). From the economic point of view such a solution suf-
fices to constitute the basis for the co-ordinated management of two
or more companies.
Interlocking Directorship Studies in the Past
Interlocking directorships have been the subject of empirical studies
for years.
Brayshay, Cleary and Sellwood (2006) studied the links between
companies in the 1930s. In their opinion the degree of complexity
of connections that created a potential indirect link between two (or
three) firms, and the interlaced personal networks of contacts ap-
peared to have increased sharply between the early 1900s and the
1930s. They examined the backgrounds and shared spaces of in-
teractions of just one powerful member of Britain’s 1930s multina-
tional corporate elite: Patrick Ashley Cooper. Cooper was himself the
connection that interlocked the London boards of ten companies of
which he was a director between 1931 and 1932. Multiple director-
ships were common; the average number held a by member of such
group was a little over six.
Burris investigated ‘the political behaviour of corporations and
corporate elites who occupy pivotal locations within networks formed
by interlocking directorships’ (Burris 1991). He studied how indi-
viduals (members of the ‘inner circle’) contributed to the national
elections in the usa in 1972, and how corporations contributed to
the national elections in 1980. The results of these studies indicate
that as the number of directorships increases, political behaviour
of individuals becomes more conservative. On the contrary, highly
interlocked corporations seem less conservative than the average.
The studies described by Hughes, Scott, and Mackenzie concern
the comparison between the number and the changes of interlock-
ing directorships in Norway, Sweden and Scotland (Hughes, Scott,
and Mackenzie 1977). They showed that the number of interlocking
directorships decreased in Scotland between 1906 and 1973. They
explained this fact by suggesting that ‘whilst the earlier period was
marked by a clustering of formally independent companies through
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interlocking directorships, the later period involves the existence of
a large conglomerate group of enterprises between which there is
the need for only a low level of interlocking’. In Scotland in 1906,
21.6% of all directors held two or more directorships, by 1973 this
figure had fallen to 10.5%.
Carroll and Alexander examined the top 250 corporations and as-
sociated networks of interlocking directorates in Canada and Aus-
tralia in the 1990s (Carroll and Alexander 1999). They found that in
Australia 226 directors and executives hold at least two corporate po-
sitions in the top 250, while in Canada the boards and executives of
the top 250 companies had 560 such interlockers. In all, the 226 Aus-
tralian interlockers carried 596 interlocks while the 560 Canadian
interlockers carried 1,994 interlocks. In Australia the mean board
size was 7.7 and the mean degree of interlocked boards was 3.7; in
Canada the mean board size was 13.2 and the mean degree of inter-
locked boards was 11.3.
Scott constructed a general model of power in intercorporate net-
works in which there are three types of relationships: personal, cap-
ital and commercial (Scott 1991). The most important types of per-
sonal relationship are interlocking directorships and the kinship re-
lationships among the individuals involved in various corporations.
Scott studied these relations in different companies in America, Eu-
rope and Asia. Interlocking directorships are present in every econ-
omy but in his opinion there are different reasons for the creation of
such networks.
Mac Canna, Brennan, and O’Higgins described the studies con-
cerning interlocking directorships in the 250 biggest Irish compa-
nies. They also compared results with previous studies conducted
by Stokamn, Zeigler, and Scott in 1985. In Ireland the percentage
of multiple directorships (only 8% in the studied sample) is smaller
than in other countries examined by Stokamn, Zeigler, and Scott,
and, in addition to this, in Ireland there are fewer directorships held
by one director (only 1.11 directorships per one director). Women
held only 4.4% of the total directorships in Ireland (Mac Canna,
Brennan, and O’Higgins 1998).
Barbi studied interlocking directorships in Italian companies (Bar-
bi 2000). The data set was created from the total directory appoint-
ments in listed companies from 1983 to 1998. She considered 15,219
directory appointments concerning 232 companies and 855 directors.
The information relating to each ‘director’ concerned the type of ap-
pointment, and the entry and exit time. Three different periods of
time were studied. Barbi basically concluded that the phenomenon
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of interlocking directorate in Italy was decreasing. There was also a
decreasing trend in the number of links among the companies.
Theisen describes the studies concerning interlocking director-
ships (Personelle Verflechtungen) which have been carried out in
the 100 largest German corporations and which identified 840 inter-
locking directorships on the board of directors level (Theisen 2000).
Interlocking directorships are also held by people who have fin-
ished their industrial activities. Brickley, Linck and Coles (Brickley,
Linck, and Coles 1999) have studied what happens to ceos after they
retire. They found that, for the ceos who leave the firm aged 64, 65
or 66, ‘the average number of board seats held two years after retire-
ment is 2.48. Nearly 88% of such ceos hold at least one board seat,
42% hold three or more seats, and just over 28% of the retired ceos
hold four or more seats.’ ‘At the extreme, Allen F. Jacobson served as
a director of eleven large corporations two years after having retired
as ceo of Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company.’ The av-
erage annual pay for an outside director serving on a single board is
$44,000. Mr. Jacobson received approximately $595,000 for his board
service. ‘Many companies also provide directors with pension plans,
insurance and other benefits, and perquisites’. Additionally, a chair-
man often receives hundreds of thousands of dollars for serving in
such position (Brickley, Linck, and Coles 1999).
The research which has been recently carried out had much more
sophisticated goals. For example, Fich and Shivdasani investigated
‘the reputation impact of financial fraud for outside directors based
on a sample of firms facing shareholder class action lawsuits’ (Fich
and Shivdasani 2007). The sample of sued firms contained 1,241 out-
side directors, 396 of which held directorships in firms other than
the firm sued for fraud. They found ‘a dramatic decline in the other
directorships held by these outside directors’. On average, outside
directors of sued firms experienced a reduction of about 50% in the
number of other directorships held, and 96% of outside directors who
sit on another board lost at least one directorship within three years
following the lawsuit. The direct financial value of lost directorships
is estimated to be approximately $1 million. The average number of
other directorships held by outside directors of sued firms was as
high as 0.96 in the year of the lawsuit. In the following three years
the number fell to 0.47.
Harford investigated, among other things, the effect of takeover
bids on the number of future board seats held by target directors
(Harford 2003). In his opinion there are at least three main factors
plausibly at work in the market for directors. Directors are sought
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who: firstly, have experience and a reputation for maximizing share-
holder value, secondly, are passive directors with a reputation for
loyalty to management, and thirdly, have good personal networks –
directorships are partially determined by who knows whom. Har-
ford studied a sample of 1,091 directors from 91 Fortune 1000 firms
which were targeted from 1988 to 1991. 29% of inside directors and
58% of outside directors held other Fortune 1000 directorships. The
mean age of all directors was 59.89. The mean number of additional
directorships was 1.94: 1.01 for inside directors and 2.36 for outside
directors. The mean board size was as high as 11.99. Harford’s stud-
ies documented that only 10% of the target outside directors were
typically retained following a completed merger.
On the basis of these short studies of literature the following con-
clusions can be drawn:
1. Interlocking directorships have existed as a phenomenon for
many years, and they have also been the subject of various stud-
ies for many years.
2. They are interpreted as the ‘social relations of class hegemony’,
‘vehicles in the accumulation of capital’, ‘social network between
companies’ or a legal instrument which helps to control a firm.
At the same timer they constitute the basis for co-ordinated
management of two or more companies.
3. The subject of earlier research was the extent and the changes
in interlocking directorships, while the subject of the latest re-
search was the influence of, for example, a financial fraud or
takeover bid on the number of directorships.
Database and its Development
Studies concerning interlocking directorships have been carried out
among Polish joint stock corporations. The main source of data were
the announcements which have to be published regularly by corpo-
rations in a journal called Business and Court Gazette (bcg). There
are two kinds of announcements. The first is published when a com-
pany is established, the second is published when changes to the
bodies of the authority occur.
The idea was to move these announcements onto a computer
database. Unfortunately the bcg is only published in a paper ver-
sion, which poses a major difficulty for such studies. The layout of
the announcements in the bcg is predefined. All entries are divided
into chapters, boxes and fields all of which allows for relatively easy
access to the information sought.
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figure 1 The relationship in the database
The database which was developed comprises of a set of three ta-
bles. The relationships between the tables are shown in figure 1. The
first table ‘Main’ consists of nine fields which describe entries in the
bcg. The second table ‘Persons’ consists of five fields describing peo-
ple. This table contains people’s personal data with a personal iden-
tification number (pesel), and those people to whom such a number
has not been assigned. This, however, makes it impossible to use the
pesel number to search the database and identify the people listed
in the table. People who pay their taxes in Poland have a pesel. Gen-
erally, foreigners do not have a pesel number, however, this is not
a strict rule. The pesel enables to identify the age of a particular
person and their sex. Therefore, the problem was solved by each
person receiving a unique numerical identifier (person_id) which is
generated by the computer system. The third table is used to iden-
tify companies. This table contains the number of the National Court
Register (krs) – the same as in the first table – and the name of the
company. The krs number is unique for each company, which allows
for accurate identification.
Data can be entered in the database in two ways. One is the tra-
ditional way by which data are entered manually. This, however, is
time consuming and practically ineffective in view of the large num-
ber of announcements published in bcg on a daily basis. The other
is largely automated and follows the procedure below.
1. The relevant excerpts from the paper edition of bcg (the only
one available) are scanned and stored as pdf files.
2. pdf files are converted into text formats with the application of
Text Processing Software (Fine Reader software has been used).
3. The relevant fragments of the text files are then pasted into the
appropriate fields of the Mysql database by using php scripts.
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php (Hypertext Pre-processor) does not have many complex func-
tions in the conversion of character strings but those which are avail-
able enable the application of this language in the situation in ques-
tion.
The key element of the process is the conversion of pdf files into
text files because there are errors that are difficult to eliminate.
There are two kinds of errors:
1. Errors which appear in bcg announcements and are made by
Journal editors.
2. Errors made while transferring the text from pdf format to txt
format. These errors result from inaccurate printing of the text.
Inaccurate printing causes Fine Reader to make mistakes dur-
ing text recognition. Errors can be made in particular during
the recognition of names, surnames, company names and for-
eign languages.
Every day there are several pages of announcements in the bcg
concerning joint stock companies. By combining several pages of
announcements published in one month, it is possible to create a
text file which is subsequently analysed prior to registration in the
database. A text file which contains announcements from one month
usually comprises more than 250 pages.
As of 15 April 2008, all changes in the composition of Management
Boards and Boards of Directors in Polish joint stock companies made
during the period fromMarch 2001 to November 2007 were recorded
in the database, i. e. 153,886 announcements. The same number of
entries is therefore made in the first (main) table. These announce-
ments referred to 69,393 people (this is the number of entries in the
second table) and 7,451 companies (i. e. the number of entries in the
third table). At present, the database is regularly updated to include
the data from the past few months. Assuming that the database con-
tains data from at least five years, a full picture of the composition
of Management Boards and Boards of Directors for all Polish joint
stock companies can be obtained. It is worth bearing in mind that
the term of office for the Board of Directors and Management Board
members must not exceed five years.
Interlocking Directorships
On the basis of the data collected in the database so far, it is possible
to make some conclusions concerning interlocking directorships. It
must be stressed that in Poland there is no legal restriction regarding
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figure 2 The number of supervisory board members
the number of interlocking directorships. The situation is the same
as in Italy (Bianchi, Bianco, and Enriques 2001).
membership numbers in the bodies of authority
On the basis of the data collected, we can work out the average num-
ber of members in particular bodies of authority. The board of direc-
tors of Polish joint stock companies on average consists of 6.59 mem-
bers (2.14 inside directors and 4.45 outside directors). 13% of board
members are foreigners (people who do not possess a pesel num-
ber). About 26.6% of the boards’ members are women. The average
age of an inside director is 44.26 whereas that of an outside director
is 44.84.
Some details are presented in figure 2. As we can see, the super-
visory board (the members of which are outside directors) usually
consists of three or five members. Generally, a situation in which
the supervisory board consists of four members is avoided. This is
probably due to the fact that companies want to facilitate voting and
avoid the situation of a tied vote. We can see from figure 2 that some
supervisory boards consist of fewer than three members as required
number 3 · fall 2008 213
Marek Pawlak
8913
3384
1435
636
417
308
89
910
511
112
213
114
315
016
117
118
38562
347491
292510
Number of persons
N
u
m
b
er
of
in
te
rl
oc
ki
n
g
d
ir
ec
to
rs
h
ip
s
figure 3 The number of directorships held in Polish joint stock companies
by law. This may result from the fact that some board members may
have lost their mandates and no one has yet been appointed to these
positions. Possibly some were appointed before March 2001, still
hold their positions and so they were not taken into consideration
in the database.
The number of directorships held in Polish joint stock companies
is presented in figure 3. The total number of people in the database
is 69,393. Some of them (29,251) currently do not have any director-
ships. 34,749 people serve only in one company, 3,856 serve in two
companies, and so on. 13.43% people possess more than one direc-
torship. The numbers presented in figure 3 concern the functions in
the supervisory boards and also in the management boards. As we
can see, there are people who have as many as 17 or even 18 direc-
torships.
The average number of multiple directorships for the whole group
is 2.541. For the foreigners (people who do not possess a pesel num-
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figure 4 Management board of a company and interlocking directorships
ber) this number is somewhat higher – 2.563 – and for people who
possess a pesel number it is somewhat lower – 2.540.
connections between corporations
Interlocking directorships constitute a network between corpora-
tions which enables the co-ordinated management of the whole
group. An example of such a situation is shown in figure 4. The
management board of the company x consists of 8 people. Four of
them serve in other companies on the supervisory boards and also
on management boards. In figure 4 only four companies are shown
which are connected with the company through its management
board. These interlocking directorships facilitate the co-ordinated
management of the whole group of five companies. In the company
there are subsidiaries that are also managed thanks to interlock-
ing directorships. For example, one the members of the company’s
management board, also serves on the board of directors of the com-
pany’s eleven subsidiaries.
changes in interlocking directorships
In the analysed period from 2001 to 2007, the number of interlock-
ing directorships has changed. This is shown in figure 5. When cal-
culating these numbers people who were holding more than one di-
rectorship were taken into consideration. We omitted the year 2001
because this was the year when companies started publishing an-
nouncements and therefore this year is not comparable. It is clear
that from the year 2002 until 2004 the number of multiple director-
ships decreased. After that, from the years 2004 to 2007 the number
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figure 6 Growth rate of real gdp per inhabitant (in %)
of interlocking directorships again increased. The tendency might
be correlated with some general economic indexes like the Gross
Domestic Product (gdp), and, in our opinion, this issue requires a
future study.
the correlation between the number of
interlocking directorships and the economic
development data
In figures 6 and 7 two indicators are shown which characterise the
Polish economy: the growth rate of real gdp per inhabitant (%) and
the total investment as a % of gdp.
The year 2001 has been omitted because data concerning inter-
locking directorships are not comparable for this year (in 2001 com-
panies only started publishing their announcements).
First we study the correlation between the total investment (the
independent variable) and the number of interlocking directorships
(the dependent variable). In figure 7 the regression line y= 0.006x+
2.389 is shown, and also the coefficient of determination R2 = 0.635.
Thus, the correlation coefficient R= 0.7969.
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figure 8 The regression between total investment and number of directorships
(y=0.006x+2.389, R2 = 0.635)
For this example we can also compute the Spearman rank-corre-
lation coefficient. The computation results are presented in table 1.
Spearman’s R= 1−
6
∑
d2i
n(n2−1) = 1−
6(6)
6(36−1) =
5
6
.
We can now test the null hypothesis:
h0 Total investments and number of directorships are not positively
correlated;
against the alternative:
h1 Total investments and the number of directorships are positively
correlated.
The null hypothesis can be tested at a desired level of significance,
say 5 percent, and a rejection of h0 implies the existence of a posi-
tive correlation. The test is clearly a once-off test. It is performed by
computing:
x=
n(n2−1)−6(∑d2i −1)
n(n+1)n−1
.
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table 1 Computation of
∑
d2i for Spearman tests – total investments and the
number of directorships
Total
investments
(1)
Number of di-
rectorships
(2)
Rank of
investments
(3)
Rank of
directorships
(4)
Difference
(3) – (4)
Difference2
(5)2
18,7 2,525 4 5 –1 1
18,2 2,521 3 4 –1 1
18,1 2,504 1 1 0 0
18,2 2,506 2 2 0 0
19,7 2,513 5 3 2 4
22,3 2,541 6 6 0 0
∑
d2i =6
table 2 Computation of
∑
d2i for Spearman tests – growth rate of real gdp and
number of directorships
Growth rate
of real gdp
(1)
Number of di-
rectorships
(2)
Rank of real
gdp
(3)
Rank of di-
rectorships
(4)
Difference
(3) – (4)
Difference2
(5)2
1.5 2,525 1 5 –4 16
4 2,521 3 4 –1 1
5.4 2,504 4 1 3 9
3.7 2,506 2 2 0 0
6.3 2,513 5 3 2 4
6.6 2,541 6 6 0 0
∑
d2i = 30
Any value of x above 1.645 leads to the rejection of h0 and to the
existence of a positive correlation. In our example:
X = 6(6
2−1)−6(6−1)
6(6+1)6−1
≈ 1.917, 1.917> 1.645,
therefore we can reject the h0 hypothesis and accept the h1 hypothe-
sis. There is a positive correlation between the total investments and
the number of multiple directorships.
In the same way we can test the correlation between the growth
rate of real gdp per inhabitant and the number of multiple director-
ships. The calculations are presented in table 2.
We cannot reject the h0 hypothesis. There is no correlation be-
tween the growth rate of real gdp per inhabitant and the number of
multiple directorships.
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Conclusions
The phenomenon of interlocking directorships in Polish joint stock
companies is comparable with the same phenomenon existing in
other countries.
1. The average size of the board of directors in Polish companies is
about 6.59. In the big companies studied by Harford (2003) this
number is 11.99.
2. The average age of board members in Polish joint stock com-
panies is about 44.26 for inside directors, and 44.84 for outside
directors. It is a relatively young group. For example, in a sample
of 1,091 directors from 91 Fortune 1000 firms studied by Harford
the mean age of all directors is 59.89 (Harford 2003).
3. About 26.6% of the board members of Polish joint stock compa-
nies are women. This concerns only those who have a pesel.
It is quite a big share. In comparison, in Ireland women held
only 4.4% of the total directorships (Mac Canna, Brennan, and
O’Higgins 1998).
4. About 13.43% directors of Polish joint stock companies hold ad-
ditional directorships. In the sample studied by Harford (2003)
29% of inside directors and 58% of outside directors held other
directorships, however, Harford only studied big companies that
are listed in Fortune 1000. In Scotland in 1973 10.5% of all direc-
tors held two or more directorships (Hughes, Scott, andMacken-
zie 1977). The number of multiple directors in Poland is com-
parable to the number of multiple directors in other European
countries studied by Stokman and Wasseur (Mac Canna, Bren-
nan, and O’Higgins 1998).
5. The average number of directorships for the whole group serv-
ing in Polish joint stock companies is 1.207, and 2.541 for people
who hold more than one mandate. In the sample studied by Har-
ford (2003), the mean number of additional directorships was
1.94 (inside directors 1.01, outside directors 2.36).
6. There is a positive correlation between total investments in %
of gdp and multiple directorships number in Polish join stock
corporations.
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